The Role of Accounts and Apologies in Mitigating Blame toward Human and Machine Agents by Stowers, Kimberly
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2017 
The Role of Accounts and Apologies in Mitigating Blame toward 
Human and Machine Agents 
Kimberly Stowers 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Stowers, Kimberly, "The Role of Accounts and Apologies in Mitigating Blame toward Human and Machine 
Agents" (2017). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 5932. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/5932 
  
 
 
 
 
MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS AND TRUSTWORTHINESS:  
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTS AND APOLOGIES IN PERCEPTIONS OF 
HUMAN AND MACHINE AGENTS 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
KIMBERLY STOWERS 
B.S. University of Central Florida, 2013 
M.S. University of Central Florida, 2015 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Department of Psychology 
in the College of Sciences  
at the University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
 
 
 
 
Summer Term  
2017 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Peter A. Hancock 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Kimberly Stowers 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Would you trust a machine to make life-or-death decisions about your health and safety? 
Machines today are capable of achieving much more than they could 30 years ago—and the 
same will be said for machines that exist 30 years from now. The rise of intelligence in machines 
has resulted in humans entrusting them with ever-increasing responsibility. With this has arisen 
the question of whether machines should be given equal responsibility to humans—or if humans 
will ever perceive machines as being accountable for such responsibility. For example, if an 
intelligent machine accidentally harms a person, should it be blamed for its mistake? Should it be 
trusted to continue interacting with humans? Furthermore, how does the assignment of moral 
blame and trustworthiness toward machines compare to such assignment to humans who harm 
others? I answer these questions by exploring differences in moral blame and trustworthiness 
attributed to human and machine agents who make harmful moral mistakes. Additionally, I 
examine whether the knowledge and type of reason, as well as apology, for the harmful incident 
affects perceptions of the parties involved. In order to fill the gaps in understanding between 
topics in moral psychology, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, valuable 
information from each of these fields have been combined to guide the research study being 
presented herein.  
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For every child who dares to dream.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“I am putting myself to the fullest possible use, which is all I think that 
any conscious entity can ever hope to do.” 
- HAL; 2001, A Space Odyssey (Movie) 
 
As machines have evolved, their usefulness has also grown—allowing them to adopt 
meaningful roles in many areas of society. Machine agents (that is, machines with some form of 
nascent “intelligence”) have been developed to aid in domains such as military command and 
control by collecting and sharing information to facilitate strategic military missions (McGrath, 
Chacón, & Whitebread, 2000). Such agents have also been developed to help people in many 
differing contexts. For example, a robotic agent has been developed to help blind people navigate 
busy streets (Harris, 2015); a multitude of intelligent personal assistants have been designed to 
help organize and find information for people (e.g. Apple’s Siri, Google’s “Google Now,” and 
Microsoft’s Cortana). As a result of these endeavors, humans are not only relying more on 
machine agents, but also beginning to see them as potential teammates and friends (Ososky, 
Schuster, Phillips, & Jentsch, 2013; Piore, 2014). Many people in modern society eagerly 
celebrate this dawn of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”—which is driven by the universality 
and versatility of intelligence that exists in technology today (Schwab, 2016). 
The adoption of machines into these meaningful roles has resulted in a number of 
controversies—particularly regarding their potential for harm. Many luminaries and skeptics 
have voiced concern about the risks and dangers of letting machines have untrammeled 
intelligence, lest they use that power to make humans obsolete (Bostrom, 2014; Future of Life 
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Institute, 2015; Hancock, 2017; Stowers, Leyva, Hancock, & Hancock, 2016). Indeed, there is 
already the potential for harm in machines with no intelligence at all. For example, while drones 
can be used in search and rescue operations (Muoio, 2016), they can also be used to make strikes 
on enemies in warfare (Woods, 2015). Even machines such as surgical robots, designed to help 
people, have accidentally killed patients whilst being used (BBC, 2015). But machines have 
always had an element of risk inherent in their physicality. Adding intelligence to machines 
introduces greater complexity, and the potential for greater risks. For example, in May, 2016, a 
Tesla vehicle with a relatively simplified level of “intelligence” (i.e. it could sense its 
surroundings and act on them) struck a tractor trailer while essentially driving itself (using 
autopilot; see Muoio, 2016). While the vehicle was supposed to be under supervision by its 
driver, the accident occurred with no interference from the driver, leaving society to question the 
locus of fault. 
Such harm as that detailed above has not prevented society as a whole from using 
machines, or even relying on them, on a daily basis. Indeed, some might argue that modern 
civilized society has little choice. Citizens continue to use, rely on, and relate to machines of 
varying levels of intelligence with seemingly little regard for potential disasters, at least until 
after they come to light. At this point, judgment is passed on the perpetrator—be it machine or 
human—that is seemingly responsible for the disaster. Complaints of people relying on machines 
too much only arise when disaster strikes (Carr, 2013). For example, immediately following the 
Tesla accident mentioned above, news media sparked a heated discussion surrounding an 
unverified claim that the driver of the Tesla vehicle was watching a movie instead of supervising 
his vehicle (Levin & Woolf, 2016).   
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Herein lies a gap in our understanding of human attitudes toward machines. What is the 
nature of human judgment toward machines when they are responsible for disaster, especially 
deadly ones? More importantly, to what extent are these machines blamed for their behaviors? 
As intelligent machines are now an integral part of society’s triumphs and tragedies, it is 
necessary to examine blame in this context to understand and increase their safe acceptance in 
society. After all, the process of forming a judgment or evaluation of a person lays the 
groundwork for establishing trust in human relationships (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995;  
Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Likewise, breakdowns in trust and relationships are 
embedded in ongoing judgements—including the placement of blame—regarding behaviors 
(Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006). Such effects may also arise in human interaction with 
machine agents, especially when lives are at stake and morality becomes a driving design factor. 
At present, our understanding of moral blame toward machines remains limited. We have 
not specified how such blame emerges and how it can aid or impair acceptance of machines. 
However, human judgment and blame of other humans may offer a parallel for understanding 
how they may blame machines for morally-laden decisions. Much research has been completed 
on the concept of moral judgment—herein defined as the evaluation of “right versus wrong”—
and its relationship to moral blame—or the perceived blameworthiness of an individual for 
engaging in a behavior that is judged to be “wrong” (see Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). 
This research, often conducted using written vignettes describing various morally conflicting 
behaviors which participants must react to, has helped in the understanding of human placement 
of blame and how it can be mitigated or exacerbated. Yet, the findings to date present a rather 
complex picture of human blame. For example, research has shown that even harmless actions 
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can be judged as morally blameworthy if the actor in question benefits from misfortune caused 
by the action (Inbar, Pizarro, & Cushman, 2012). Research has also shown that if such an actor is 
portrayed as having done something wrong intentionally (as opposed to accidentally), perceived 
blameworthiness is not only higher, but the perception of the crime itself is also greater in 
magnitude (Ohtsubo, 2007;  Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006). 
It is possible that such research can be applied to our understanding of human judgments 
of machine behavior, since some work has already shown potential parallels between the two. 
For example, social attraction theories governing the response of humans’ acceptance of each 
other also govern humans’ acceptance of machine agents (Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 
1995). However, humans don’t always respond to machines in the same way they respond to 
each other. They don’t even respond to less humanlike machines the same way they respond to 
more humanlike machines, as has been found in research showing that contrasting trust 
constructs differed according to the “humanness” of machines being interacted with (Lankton, 
McKnight, & Tripp, 2015). Effects such as these reinforce the caution by some researchers 
against the creation of machines that are too humanlike, lest such machines instill undeserved 
expectations from human users and teammates, who may appraise them as being capable of a 
higher standard of behavior than they actually are (Norman, 1994). After all, humans’ appraisals 
of each other are markedly different from their appraisals of machines, leading to quite different 
expectations. For example, who would expect a modern-day machine to love or understand 
compassion? It is possible this same difference in appraisal and expectation toward humans and 
machines exists in moral blame, which is inherently based in human expectation of others’ 
behaviors. Herein lies the primary question this dissertation will examine. 
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Research Purpose 
Given the foregoing questions and gaps noted here, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore differences in moral blame attributed to human and machine agents. Specifically, this 
dissertation will examine whether the knowledge and type of reason, as well as apology, for an 
untoward incident mitigates moral blame against the parties involved. Furthermore, the effect of 
such blame on trustworthiness will be evaluated. In order to fill the gaps in understanding 
between topics in moral psychology, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, valuable 
information from each of these fields are being combined to guide the research studies being 
presented herein.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 “Morality is not just any old topic in psychology but close to our conception of the meaning of 
life. Moral goodness is what gives each of us the sense that we are worthy human beings.” 
- Steven Pinker 
One of my key goals here is to identify differences in how humans react to human agents 
versus machine agents when faced with accidents caused by these agents. To address this, 
several topics are examined in detail. First, a conceptualization of the term “agent” is presented 
in order to differentiate between current human and machine agents. Next, topics concerning 
morality, including nascent concepts in machine morality, are considered. This leads to a 
discussion on human attributions of blame toward other humans and nonhuman entities. In order 
to completely understand human blame in this context, it is necessary to consider the process of 
human moral judgment. Additionally, the role of professed reasoning and apologies in mitigating 
emotional responses and attributions of blame toward agent behavior is explored. These 
discussions culminate in a series of research questions and overall research objective—which is 
addressed through the implementation of an in-depth research study. 
Agent to Agent 
Before making direct comparisons between human reactions to human agents versus 
machine agents, it is prudent to define what an agent is, what it is not, and how the term is used 
for the present purpose. The term agent originated in the Latin word agere, meaning to do 
(Agent, 2017). The use of the term has evolved over the centuries to represent several different 
concepts, including “one who acts,” “any natural force which produces a phenomenon,” as well 
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as a “representative”. Since the early 1900s, this term has adopted further and more varied 
meanings specific to various roles humans may play. For example, today it is common to hear of 
all types of agents, including “secret agents” and “insurance agents.” It has also become common 
to see agent representing nonhuman entities (e.g. “chemical agent”). When considering the 
evolution of the term, it is not at all surprising that agent now includes several types of machines. 
While all humans can be considered agents, not all machines are agents. The specific 
designation of agent most commonly applies to machines that are intelligent enough to perceive 
and act on their surroundings with some degree of autonomy or independence (Russell & 
Norvig, 2009). This definition aligns well with the Latin origin of agent as it includes the 
requirement of action. It can also be applied to both humans and machines. Using this definition, 
Russel and Norvig (2009) make a direct comparison between human agents and machine agents: 
while a human agent perceives through eyes, and ears, etc., machine agents may perceive 
through cameras and other electronic sensors. Similarly, while human agents act on their 
surroundings using arms and legs, machine agents use motors, gears, algorithms, and other 
effectors. In this way, both human and machine agents exert action in the world.  
Many types of machines may be designated agents according to Russell and Norvig’s 
(2009) definition. For example, robots such as the Nao robot—which can see, hear, feel, speak, 
move, “think,” and even exhibit a semblance of self-awareness—would fall under this definition 
of agents (Soft Bank Robotics, 2017; Pandey, 2015). Software programs such as Watson (IBM, 
2016) and Deep Q-Network (Mnih et al., 2014; Pandey, 2015) can also be considered agents as a 
result of their capabilities in sensing, problem solving, and communicating with humans. Self-
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driving cars have also begun to shift into the roles of “agents” as they have started making 
decisions based on their perceived surroundings. Machines that would not be considered agents 
under this definition include teleoperated robots such as those used for explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and surgery (e.g. da Vinci; see Siciliano & Khatib, 2008). While robots such as 
these have the capability to sense their surroundings, they cannot currently act on their 
surroundings autonomously. Even though their sensing capabilities afford an appearance of 
intelligence beyond other machines, the fact that they merely act as an extension of human 
movement prohibits their inclusion into what Russell and Norvig would call “successful agents” 
(Russell & Norvig, 2003, p. 32). 
Within the present scope, the term agent is used to signify either a human (specified 
“human agent”) or a machine that senses and acts on its surroundings (specified “machine 
agent”; Russell & Norvig, 2003). Teleoperated robots are not included in this definition. 
Defining agents in this way maintains a focus on human interaction with cutting-edge machines 
that are so intelligent, they possess enough autonomy to take responsibility for their actions, or at 
least be blamed for them. 
Agent Autonomy 
What is “autonomy” and how much constitutes “enough to take responsibility”? 
Classically defined, autonomy (origin Greek, “autonomos”) is the freedom of control or 
government of oneself (Autonomy [Def. 1], n.d.). Inherent in autonomy is the notion of moral 
independence, or the ability to act rightly or wrongly according to one’s own desires (Autonomy 
[Def. 2], n.d). As a price for freedom and self-government, autonomous beings are granted 
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responsibility—and often (but not ubiquitously) held accountable for their behaviors. However, 
just as in the case of “agents,” modern-day definitions of autonomy have evolved to encompass 
entities that didn’t exist at its linguistic conception—in this case, machines. However, autonomy 
in humans is typically discussed in a manner entirely different from that in machine agents. 
Whereas autonomy in humans is frequently viewed as a developmental characteristic that 
changes naturally across the lifespan, autonomy in machines is both planned and designed, 
typically with some forethought concerning how the machine’s autonomy relates to its human 
counterparts. 
For example, in humans, one might consider that one has less autonomy in childhood 
than in adulthood. Further, some parents allow their children more autonomy as they age (i.e., 
promoting choice) while other parents are more controlling (i.e. pressuring them toward certain 
outcomes; Deci & Ryan, 1987). Regardless of the amount of autonomy any human is allowed, it 
is typically assumed that most humans can—and often do—attempt to achieve higher levels of 
autonomy as they mature. For example, a parent may allow one child to have more autonomy 
than another, but either child could attempt to exert a higher level of autonomy than she currently 
possesses. Indeed, humans do this throughout childhood, particularly in the first few years when 
they learn to walk and explore their surroundings (Erikson, 1963; Stapel-Wax, 2011). Even 
animals, which may appear to have less autonomy than humans, act in this way. 
On the other hand, autonomy in machines is defined and implemented in a stricter sense. 
Autonomy in machines requires the capability to independently compose and select actions to 
accomplish goals based on an understanding of the world, including a machine’s own role in 
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specific situations (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000; Shattuck, 2015). Since autonomy 
is designed and created in machines, they typically express greater limits in the extent to which 
they can vary their own behavior. Yet, autonomy in machines continues to evolve over time. 
This evolution is closely linked to success in Artificial Intelligence (AI), the capability of 
machines to perform tasks requiring increasing amounts of intelligence (DoD, 2016). As 
successes in AI allow machines to approach human-like autonomy, new problems are arising, 
including those explored herein. This work evaluates machines at the cutting edge of this 
evolution, specifically examining human reactions to machines which at first glance appear to be 
just as autonomous as adult humans. It is in this one-to-one comparison that human reactions to 
machine morality and potential blame will be most evident. 
Whose Morals? 
It is because of humans’ ability to act autonomously that we adhere to notions of morality 
in our lives, including the assessment of morality in others. But what is morality? The term 
morality is born of the Latin word moralis, or the proper behavior of a person in society 
(Morality, 2017). Morality generally involves the distinction between "good" and "bad," and can 
thus be thought of as rules that govern a society. In this way, morality acts as the spine or fiber 
that holds a society together. This can be demonstrated in the idea of tribalism, or the tendency 
for humans to favor, and often protect, those in their immediate social circle (Greene, 2014). It 
can be further distinguished through humans’ general unwillingness to harm even those they 
don’t know (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012).   
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Until recently, researchers believed morality was a trait specific to humans. Even Darwin, 
who was well ahead of his time in his understanding of human and animal life, suggested that 
morality would only be found in beings with intellectual capabilities approaching that of humans 
(Darwin, 1888). However, it has been suggested that other primates may possess morality, albeit 
in a limited way, which they exhibit through compassion and concern. For example, in a 
controlled laboratory experiment, Warnekan and colleagues found that chimpanzees were willing 
to help each other, as well as humans, without expecting rewards (Warneken & Hare, 2007; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). Examples such as this abound in 
research on nonhuman primates (Greene, 2014). Similar examples can be found in other animals 
as well, including carnivores (e.g. wolves), cetaceans (e.g. dolphins), and, even some rodents 
(e.g. rats; Bekoff & Pierce, 2009). Beyond the possibility of naturally-existing morality, there 
have also been discussions regarding the opportunity to create morality in human-nonhuman 
chimeras, which has sparked much ethical debate (Piotrowska, 2014). Still more difficult and 
controversial is the possibility of creating morality, or at least a semblance of it, in machines 
(Hancock, 2009; Stowers, Leyva, Hancock, & Hancock, 2016). In many ways, this can be 
thought of as the modern frontier of morality, especially if one considers all products of creation 
to inherently possess a moral dimension (Hancock, 2009). But to even broach this frontier, it is 
first important to consider how morality has come to exist in humans, and how it can possibly 
begin to exist in machines.  
Morality in Humans 
The origin of human morality is difficult to pinpoint since it occurred before the 
beginning of recorded history. However, theories abound concerning not only its origin in 
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humans as a species, but its development in individuals. Human morality is often presumed to 
have evolved in much the same way as other survival traits—as a characteristic that aided in 
“survival of the fittest”. Some scholars argue that genes which encouraged moral behavior 
became more prominent in humans because moral humans developed more effective social 
support systems which protected them (Broom, 2003). Other scholars suggest that the evolution 
of morality in humans grew largely as a result of brutal social control that may have emerged 
45,000 years ago (Boehm, 2012). The stricter the enforcement of this control (which often 
included capital punishment), the more likely was the social selection of morality (i.e. behaving 
according to expected social norms). Those who didn’t act according to social norms were 
“eliminated,” while the rest survived and passed on genetic and behavioral traits necessary to 
successfully survive in tribes. It is difficult to test either of these hypotheses. However, research 
on Late-Pleistocene Appropriate (LPA) hunter-gatherer societies that exist today gives some 
credibility to the latter (Boehm, 2012). This idea of morality-by-sanction is also consistent with 
modern-day use of punishment for controlling inappropriate behavior, making it a promising 
explanation for modern human morality, and perhaps even prospective machine morality.  
As difficult as it has been to reach consensus on the moral evolution of the human 
species, the moral development of individual present-day humans—while much easier to study—
has proven equally as difficult to understand. Kohlberg (1973) postulated that moral reasoning, 
specifically defined as one’s sense of justice, develops in 6 discrete stages that last throughout 
one’s life (Kohlberg, 1973). The linear development of moral reasoning according to this theory 
provides support for the idea that as children gain moral competence (i.e. understanding right 
versus wrong in increasingly complex situations), they are really gaining moral autonomy. Such 
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a notion aligns well with our understanding of the allowance of behavioral autonomy in children 
discussed above. However, conflicting evidence arose regarding Kohlberg’s original proposed 
developmental stages, causing other researchers to begin operationalizing morality and moral 
development in increasingly varied ways. Turiel and colleagues (1983) proposed the Domain 
Theory, which explains human moral development in connection with societal and psychological 
development. According to this theory, morality is also operationalized in a much broader sense 
than simply justice, and includes concepts such as fairness and equality (Turiel, 1983). More 
recent work has broadened the scope of morality even further, as can be seen in Moral 
Foundations Theory, which explicitly seeks to define and measure morality across five 
foundational dimensions: care, fairness, loyalty, respect, and sanctity (Graham et al., 2011, 
2012). Moral Foundations Theory, originally developed to understand morality across cultures, 
has successfully highlighted that morality is much more complex than even envisioned by Turiel.  
Today, we know that the manifestations of morality vary across history, religions and 
context. Local and religious morality systems may dictate different rules on the respect of deities 
and cultural customs (Greene, 2014). Within a single system, morality may still change over 
time. For example, attitudes on the morality of various sexual tendencies and behaviors in 
Western societies changed substantially in the second half of the twentieth century relative to the 
first half (Stewart-Williams, 2010). This can be evidenced in the de-criminalization and wider 
acceptance of homosexuality, as well as a wider acceptance of promiscuity. This ongoing 
variation in morality makes it difficult to study, and even more difficult to understand. In such an 
ever-changing and diverse world, is there any such thing as fixed moral precepts? Where will 
morality take us next? 
14 
 
Morality in Machines 
The coming frontier in morality may very well look to apply morality to machines. But 
can machines possess the same morals humans do? At present, no. While machines are 
programmed to follow a set of preset guidelines, these guidelines do not operate the way human 
morals do. They’re simply a set of directives, instructions, or algorithms, leaving the machine 
computationally restricted in their behaviors (Brundage, 2014; Stowers, Leyva, Hancock & 
Hancock, 2016). Furthermore, machines do not exhibit emotional conflicts when they have to 
take a life. Nor do they necessarily weigh the cost of life the same way humans do (i.e. with an 
emotional element). While attempts have been made to design “moral emotions” into machines 
(e.g. guilt), such emotions are algorithmically based and not organically developed or learned 
(see Arkin, 2011; Arkin & Ulam, 2009). 
The idea of implementing morality in machines is not a new one. This topic has gained 
increasing attention over the years (Hancock, 2009; Hancock, 2017), especially as machines 
have grown enough in intelligence to make decisions that shape human lives. Take, for example, 
the growth of automation in cars. What began as anti-lock braking systems to save humans from 
needing to repeatedly apply the brakes in quick succession, and electronic stability control to 
prevent humans from loss of control on slick roads, has now progressed to autopilot functions 
which steer, merge, and brake for humans. Fully automated commercial road vehicles are also 
now being tested, with their widespread implementation coming in the near future (Sage & 
Lienert, 2016).  
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The introduction of fully automated vehicles to mainstream public traffic has led to a new 
series of questions, not altogether unlike those already studied in human morality. For example, 
after it became apparent that autonomous cars are a realistic part of our future, several 
information sources called for research examining how cars should react in “trolley problems” 
(Lin, 2013). In the traditional trolley problem, a human is faced with an unavoidable collision 
and must decide whether to let the trolley kill five people on the tracks it is currently set on, or 
switch it to kill just one person on another set of track. In the machine version of this problem, an 
autonomous car will be faced with a choice between two collisions (avoiding one will cause the 
other), and will have to decide how to respond. As in the traditional problem, someone will die 
no matter what happens. Figure 1 illustrates an example of such a collision where there is no 
escape. Should the car save its passenger no matter what, or should it instead prioritize the 
number of lives that will be saved overall?  
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Figure 1. An autonomous car approaches an unavoidable accident, and is faced with the choice between killing five 
pedestrians or killing two of the passengers in the vehicle. Image created by Scalable Cooperation at MIT Media Lab. 
A recent series of studies examined human reactions to this dilemma and found that we 
as humans don’t have a consistent opinion about how this should be resolved (Bonnefon, Shariff, 
& Rahwan, 2016). Results from these studies showed that, while participants believed that 
autonomous vehicles should prioritize the number of lives saved over their own passengers, they 
would not be comfortable being in a vehicle which operated under this rubric. Instead, they 
preferred to be in vehicles which always prioritized their own passengers’ lives over the lives of 
others. Unsurprisingly, given the conflicting feelings humans have about how these dilemmas 
should be handled, participants also stated that they didn’t want responses to such dilemmas by 
the machine to be mandated legally.  
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As enticing as the trolley problem sounds, the reality is machines aren’t designed to deal 
with such moral dilemmas because they are unlikely to arise in a machine-driven world (Hern, 
2016). The design of machines for everyday situations such as driving or handling office work is 
typically centered on creating a level of perfection that won’t allow for the mistakes that lead to 
killing someone. On the rare occasion that such a dilemma does arise, the machine’s 
programming is most likely to have a directive to stop rather than swerve (if a self-driving 
vehicle) or behave in as conservative a way as possible (if in a healthcare or workplace setting).  
Yet, even though machines likely won’t have to deal with “trolley problems,” they will 
be faced with other types of moral dilemmas. For example, some researchers have highlighted 
the concern that, even though programmers will always try to account for as many situations as 
possible when creating machine agents, there will always be a point at which a machine agent 
will be faced with a situation it hasn’t encountered, and this point may lead to harm for humans 
involved (Scheutz, 2016). This has already happened, as witnessed in the case of the Tesla 
automobile accident in Florida (Muoio, 2016). Such adverse events will likely continue to 
happen across many contexts, including worker and domestic life. This realization has led many 
to encourage the creation of “implicit ethical agents,” i.e. those with ethical and/or moral 
guidelines for moral emotions (e.g. guilt and compassion) implicitly built into their design (see 
Arkin, 2008, 2010; Moor, 2006; Scheutz, 2016; Stowers, Leyva, Hancock, & Hancock, 2016). 
An extension of such a goal would include the somewhat organic evolution of these guidelines 
through sophisticated machine learning methods. After all, humans already appear to be holding 
machines to higher standards of moral and ethical behavior, and this trend will likely continue. 
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Playing God 
Humans’ ability—and even desire—to behave “morally” lends them the ability to pass 
judgment on the morality of others’ behaviors and assign blame where they believe others should 
take responsibility. Just as humans have opinions about how one should respond to a trolley 
problem, they also have opinions about mistreating others, causing pain, or killing—whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. After all, this is fundamentally what the area of jurisprudence is 
about. Yet, even these opinions become very inexact and confusing when examining their role in 
blame toward those who exhibit morally questionable behavior. This phenomenon, the 
accusation that someone is causally responsible for seemingly immoral behavior, is often given 
the label “moral blame.” But how does moral blame work, and what are its underpinnings? 
 Moral blame, first and foremost, exists as an extension of moral judgment—judgments of 
how people should treat each other (Turiel, 1983). Such judgments can be rendered in response 
to trolley problems or other dilemmas where the perpetrator may be more directly responsible 
(Greene, 2001). Most importantly, these judgments are passed on everyday behaviors—toward a 
manager dealing with clients, toward a doctor dealing with patients, and toward other drivers on 
the roadway. Researchers have examined moral judgment in detail in order to understand how it 
happens and how it is then linked to moral blame.  
One of the hotly debated questions concerning moral judgment is whether the process of 
passing initial judgment (e.g. is that moral or immoral?) is intuitive (automatic-affective) or 
rational (reasoning-based). While many classic theories of moral development focus on the role 
of reason (e.g. Kohlberg, 1973), such research when compared to more automatic affective 
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reactions has historically yielded mixed results (e.g. Galotti, 1989). After decades of confusion 
surrounding this conflict, the modern consensus is that moral reasoning actually requires both. 
Greene and Haidt (2002) posit that people may have an automatic reaction in judging events as 
moral or immoral, but they justify their automatic reactions through post hoc rational support. 
They may be motivated to do so in order to defend against threatening ideas (Greene & Haidt, 
2002). These conclusions are backed by both behavioral and neurobiological data (Adler & Rips, 
2008; Greene, 2001). Yet our understanding of exactly how these processes occur and evolve 
remains primitive at best. Given the complexities involved in moral judgment, it is even more 
difficult to understand its relationship to moral blame. 
 Pizarro and colleagues have examined moral blame directly through several studies in 
which participants are presented with a narrative explaining that someone has engaged in some 
type of immoral behavior (e.g. intentionally smashing someone’s window, walking out of a 
restaurant without paying; Pizarro et al., 2006; Pizarro et al., 2003; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 
2003). Findings from these studies have highlighted several interesting trends in the way people 
assign moral blame. Moral blame is discounted in situations when the negative behavior appears 
to be impulsive rather than deliberate (Pizarro et al., 2003). Furthermore, moral blame toward 
others is discounted when intentions and outcomes don’t necessarily match (e.g. intending to kill 
someone, but only accidentally killing them; Pizarro et al., 2003). Most notably, moral blame in 
such situations is more likely to be attenuated when assessed intuitively, rather than rationally. 
Not only does this highlight the complexity of the intuitive versus rational moral judgment 
debate, it also creates the possibility that moral blame can be moderated by rationalizations of 
behavior. Such a possibility is one that is considered as part of this dissertation. But first, it is 
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prudent to consider whether the findings concerning blame toward human agents hold true for 
machine agents also—as it is in this primary comparison of human and machine agents that the 
purpose of the present work lies. 
Equal Blame 
Do humans judge machine agents the same way they judge each other? Should they? 
Given the many differences between humans and machines (e.g. humans are biological and 
machines are typically not, humans are conceived as possessing “free will” and machines 
generally are not), it seems logical that blame toward the two could not be identical. But what 
about in the case of very intelligent machines—particularly machines argued to be as intelligent 
or nearly as intelligent as humans? Or in the comparable case of humans deemed lacking in 
enough intelligence and maturity to receive diminished responsibility? In order to explore 
answers to such questions, it is important to first consider the following question: Are machines 
as blameworthy as humans? 
The first requirement for someone to be responsible or blameworthy for a behavior is that 
they have control over the behavior (Tognazzini & Coates, 2014). As such, many morally 
questionable behaviors that are completed under circumstances where the perpetrator has either 
limited, compromised or complete lack of control over the behavior will often be judged less 
harshly (e.g. in “crimes of passion” such as violence upon witnessing adultery; Pizarro et al., 
2003). When considering how blameworthy any machine is, particularly in comparison to a 
human, it is necessary to consider whether the machine has equal control to a human over the 
behavior. While machines don’t exhibit the sort of lack of self-control that results in emotional 
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“crimes of passion,” it can still be argued that they have less control over themselves than 
humans do. Indeed, any control machines have over themselves is primarily directed by humans 
through software programming—telling them what they are “allowed” (or even able) to do in 
certain circumstances.  
A useful, albeit imperfect, analog to the concept of self-control in machines is self-
control in children. As discussed earlier, children possess less autonomy than adults and may be 
allowed more or less autonomy by their adult guardians. Furthermore, this allowance of 
autonomy often aligns with moral development as defined by Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Hersh, 
1977) and Turiel (1983). The consequence of this social “allowance” of autonomy for children is 
that adults are frequently deemed more morally blameworthy than children when untoward 
events occur. Indeed, parents will blame each other (and often themselves) for children’s 
behavior, often operating on the sense that children’s behaviors are reflections of successful (or 
failed) parenting (Drexler, 2012). Companies have even capitalized on this tendency by 
assigning blame to parents for things that are really the fault of the companies themselves (e.g.  
when public health officials in the U.S. tried to enact legislation preventing the addition of lead 
to paint in order to prevent brain damage in children, the lead industry blamed uneducated 
parents for letting their children put lead-contaminated items in their mouths; Rosner & 
Markowitz, 2013). The general assumption is that children are not entirely responsible for their 
behaviors, and thus they are not assigned all of the blame for their behaviors; some (or all) of 
that blame is placed on the guardians instead.  
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In many societies, this attribution of less blame toward children is upheld legally through 
the assignment of milder consequences. Take, for example, the existence of juvenile court in the 
United States. A citizen under the legal age of adulthood (a “minor”) who commits a crime is 
typically tried in juvenile court—often with milder consequences if found guilty (Scalia, 1997). 
Some particularly gruesome crimes committed by minors, especially as those minors age and 
develop, may still result in them being tried in traditional courts. Yet, even under such 
circumstances, the decided punishment, especially if it involves life in prison or death, is 
considered highly controversial (Kirkland, 2012). Furthermore, some states in the US (alongside 
some countries in Europe) will still authorize punishments to parents of offending minors, on the 
basis that they were legally responsible for the minors at the time of their crimes (Le Sage & De 
Ruyter, 2008). This suggests that, in humans, the alleged blameworthiness and assignment of 
blame toward children (i.e. humans with less presumed autonomy) and adults (humans with 
more presumed autonomy) can be quite fluid.  
Autonomy in animals is far more straightforward than it is in humans, and may be a more 
appropriate analog to understanding self-control in machines. Thus it is necessary to consider 
how societal views of animal behavioral issues may apply to such views of machine behavioral 
issues. Societal expectations of animals are altogether different from their expectations of each 
other. Whereas autonomy in humans is largely linked to the developmental stage in their lifespan 
in relation to other humans, autonomy in animals is constrained by not only their development, 
but their intelligence and their domestication. For examples, animals that are not domesticated 
could be argued to have more autonomy than those who are. Similarly, a highly intelligent dog 
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could be argued to have more autonomy than a snake—simply because it has a better 
understanding of its surroundings and how to enact its own force on the world. 
Many have argued that animals have enough autonomy as beings that they should have 
rights in society (Sunstein, 2003). Yet, even while arguing for the rights of animals, not all in 
society agree that they should be given responsibility in equal measure. For example, if a dog 
attacks a child, many argue that the blame for the attack lies with the dog’s owner for mistreating 
the dog in ways that may lead it to attack. This is a perspective supported by organizations such 
as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), which exist to protect animal welfare 
(e.g. see PETA, 2017). Others argue that both the dog and the owner involved in such an attack 
should be punished accordingly—the dog through death, the human through a fine or 
incarceration. Laws vary in how they enforce these differing societal views, with some cities and 
states have specific statutes in place for handling dog attacks (Snyder, 2017). However, one thing 
remains consistent: much like the case of children, bad behavior by domesticated animals 
generally results in either alleviations of blame altogether or otherwise supplemental blame (i.e. 
blame toward someone other than the perpetrator). Thus, the question arises: where do machines, 
their creators, and even their owners fall as parties deserving of blame when a machine makes a 
mistake? Are machines “pets” and their creators or bosses “owners”? Are designers “guardians”? 
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer. 
Machines don’t have the same level of autonomy as adult humans. Much like children 
and animals, they are also not accorded full responsibility for their actions by society. Take, for 
example, the aforementioned Tesla accident. An investigation by NHTSA sought to pinpoint any 
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cause for blame toward either the automobile or the manufacturer for the accident (NHTSA, 
2017). At the close of their investigation, NHTSA reported that the vehicle, despite failing to see 
the truck it crashed into, did nothing wrong and had operated within the full limits of its 
capabilities. NHTSA also found no cause for blame toward Tesla, though many citizens would 
argue that Tesla, as the “parent,” should take responsibility to ensure drivers properly use their 
vehicles (Ohnsman, 2017). Indeed, given what we are learning about the ability of humans to 
effectively monitor semi-autonomous driving systems (Endsley, 2017), companies such as Tesla 
would do well to recognize humans’ limitations and accommodate them accordingly, rather than 
pinning the blame exclusively on the humans themselves. 
From a societal and legal perspective, lack of blame toward machines isn’t unexpected. 
After all, computation in the machines we know today has only existed in recent history, with the 
first sign of modernly-defined artificial intelligence being created in the 1940s (Russel & Norvig, 
2009). Since then, machines have gained intelligence rapidly, yet have always fallen short of 
human intelligence in the most complex areas of intelligence. For example, consider the list, 
developed by Paul Fitts and colleagues (Fitts et al., 1951), detailing the activities humans are 
better at versus those machines are better at (see figure 2). While Fitts asserted that machines are 
better at activities which require speed, power, computation, replication, multi-tasking, and 
short-term memory; humans are better at detection, perception, judgment, induction, 
improvisation, and long term memory. It has since been suggested that machines now also 
surpass humans in detection, perception, and long-term memory (Bostrom, 2014; de Winter & 
Hancock, 2015). This gives credence to the notion that machines should certainly be held to a 
higher standard now than they have been historically. Yet it doesn’t address other areas of human 
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intelligence that weren’t necessarily accounted for in Fitts list—areas that are much more 
relevant today now that machines are being trusted to make decisions. One such area is moral 
and ethical intelligence. 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of Fitts list. Humans have been historically better at detection, perception, judgment, induction, 
improvisation, and long term memory; while machines have been better at speed, power, computation, replication, 
simultaneous operations, and short term memory (Fitts et al., 1951). 
Scheutz suggests that it is through the design of machines as “ethical agents” that humans 
can start judging their moral competence (Scheutz, 2016). It is also through such design that the 
answer of whether machines should be blamed for their mistakes—especially morally impactful 
ones—could be made much more straightforward. Dennet (1997) proposes that the primary 
characteristic missing for machines to be culpable for any wrongdoing is mens rea, or knowledge 
of wrongdoing when engaging in the behavior. Mens rea is the last frontier in machines that 
must be crossed for machines to be held truly accountable for their actions in society. What 
remains unclear is how this accountability will be upheld. Will machine agents ever be 
“punished” for wrongdoing? What would such punishment look like? 
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Machines may not yet have mens rea, but they do possess increasing amounts of 
autonomy, and it is this autonomy that opens them up to blame in everyday interactions, 
regardless of their legal culpability. Furthermore, the average citizen interacting with machines 
isn’t necessarily aware of a machine agent’s lack of mens rea. Indeed, many people believe 
machines possess intentionality (Friedman & Millet, 1995). Research has also shown that human 
belief in machine capabilities may extend beyond mens rea to other qualities inherent to human 
agents. The idea that humans may apply social rules to machines is known as “Computers Are 
Social Actors” (CASA; Nass et al., 1995), or the Theory of Social Responses to Computers 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996). This theory and related research contends that humans’ interactions with 
machines are inherently social. As a result of this social interaction, humans categorize machines 
as social actors much like themselves and may judge them with the same favor (Broadbent, 
2017; Nass & Moon, 2000). 
This theory of machines as social actors may explain some trends in task-based blame 
toward machines that already exist. For example, Hinds and colleagues (2004) found that, in 
interacting with robots on a joint task, people are more likely to blame robots for low team 
performance when the robots appear to be in positions of elevated status (i.e., supervisors; Hinds, 
Roberts, & Jones, 2004). It was similarly found that attribution of blame is heightened toward 
robots that are more autonomous (Kim & Hinds, 2006). This suggests that, as machine agents 
continue to gain reputations for having intelligence, increasing levels of blame will be placed on 
them. These findings have also been upheld in research examining moral blame in morally 
charged decisions. Research comparing moral blame toward machine and human agents has 
found that autonomous machines with the capacity to make decisions are certainly targets for 
27 
 
moral blame in moral dilemmas (Malle, Scheutz, Arnold, Voiklis, & Cusimano, 2015). Machines 
overall received the same amount of blame as humans for their responses to moral dilemmas. 
The primary difference between them was that machine agents typically received more blame for 
inaction, while humans received more blame for action. The narrative examined in this 
dissertation involves a decision that results in action.  
Here, I examine whether judging machines as social actors extends to machine agents in 
control of self-driving cars—a technological area fraught with controversy in society. Whereas a 
theory of social actors might support that there should be no difference in moral blame toward 
human and machine agents, my first hypothesis explores whether the alternative could be true. 
Given that the scenario included herein involves a morally-charged mistake resulting from 
action, it is possible that human perception of that mistake may vary when completed by a 
human agent compared to a machine agent. Furthermore, given that society has already begun to 
form opinions on the culpability of (or lack thereof) self-driving cars involved in accidents, it is 
worth considering how their views translate in such a scenario as the one examined here. Thus, 
my first hypothesis indicates that a morally-charged mistake made by a human agent will result 
in a higher attribution of moral blame compared to a machine agent making the same mistake 
(see Table 1). 
Should I Trust You? 
A primary impact of moral judgment and moral blame lies in the establishment of trust 
toward agents being judged or blamed. The assessment of an agent’s moral character is partly an 
assessment of one’s trustworthiness to behave morally. After all, trustworthiness is considered 
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one of many characteristics that encompass one’s moral character (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 
2011; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). But what is trustworthiness and how are perceptions of 
trustworthiness impacted by moral blame? 
 Trustworthiness, as defined by Mayer and colleagues (1995), is the complex interplay of 
three factors in an agent that will lead it to be more or less trusted.  Those three factors have been 
primarily identified as 1) ability, 2) benevolence, and 3) integrity. Ability refers to the skills and 
competencies that allow an agent to be successful in a domain, and involves little to no 
assumptions on the morality of that agent.  Benevolence and integrity, however, are largely 
moral in nature. Benevolence—or the degree to which an agent wants to do good—and 
integrity—or the set of acceptable principles an agent adheres to—are largely centered on ideas 
of right and wrong (i.e., morality). While each of these three factors may vary independently, 
they form a complex interrelationship which is the basis of perceived trustworthiness in agents 
(Mayer et al., 1995).  
Judgments about trustworthiness in others are usually made quickly, much more quickly 
than characteristics such as likeability. Thus, trust judgments are a part of the first impressions 
humans make of others when meeting them (Willis & Todorov, 2006). From an evolutionary 
standpoint, such swift judgments of trustworthiness are necessary, as it helps humans to avoid 
agents who may harm (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). Perceptions of trustworthiness can also be 
influenced by other factors; particularly in relation to morality. For example, in a series of 
studies examining perceptions of human agents’ moral judgments, participants rated agents as 
more trustworthy when the agents’ judgments were more deontologically driven (i.e., driven by 
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moral duty; Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016). This suggests that humans not only make 
judgments regarding others’ morality; they base their perceptions of trustworthiness on it as well.  
Research regarding perceptions of trust in and trustworthiness of machine agents 
compared to human agents is somewhat mixed. While some question whether trustworthiness in 
its classical form (e.g., ability, benevolence, integrity) is ever perceived of machines (Friedman 
et al., 2000), a great deal of research suggests otherwise (e.g., Cassell & Bickmore, 2000; 
Komiack, 2003). Specifically, it has been found that trust and trustworthiness is quite similar 
toward human and machine agents, with differences lying mainly in precisely how it is 
developed (Benbasat & Wang, 2005; Komiak, Wang, & Benbasat, 2004). This research, 
alongside the CASA theory (Nass, et al., 1995), lends support to the idea that perceived 
trustworthiness of human and machine agents shouldn’t be that different. However, the studies 
that found these similarities focused largely on computer interfaces and web-based agents. 
Researchers have yet to say how these findings transfer to other contexts.  
Once again, it is important to consider whether a machine agent driving a vehicle will be 
considered in the same light as a human agent driving a vehicle. Can a self-driving car be trusted, 
or is it trustworthy, if all it does is drive? Do attributes such as benevolence and integrity apply 
to self-driving cars? If humans attribute a wider range of moral qualities to other humans than 
machines, then it may follow that they will be more likely to find other humans trustworthy, 
especially in the case of self-driving cars, which society may view as having less agency than a 
robot or a speaking computer. Thus, a second hypothesis being examined follows: a morally-
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charged mistake made by a human agent will still result in a higher perceived trustworthiness 
toward that agent compared to a machine agent making the same mistake (see Table 1). 
“I’m sorry!”—Accounts and Apologies 
Although it is useful to understand how humans assign blame to each other as well as 
machines, and the effect this blame has on perceptions of trustworthiness, it is much more 
meaningful to explore ways in which moral blame and resulting decrement in perceived 
trustworthiness might be mitigated. Such information can aid in the design of communication 
capacities in machine agents. This can also assist in pinpointing areas where machine agents may 
be more (or less) likely to repair their reputations with humans after making morally repugnant 
mistakes. 
Malle (2016) argues that a key characteristic of morality in robots should be the ability to 
engage in moral communication—including the explanation of any behaviors that violate norms 
(e.g., morally questionable actions). After all, communication plays a key role in any expression 
of morality, blame, and forgiveness. To evaluate this, I will explore two methods of 
communication which can repair damaged reputations and relationships: 1) accounts and 2) 
apologies. An account can be thought of as a statement made to explain unexpected or 
unacceptable behavior (Scott & Lyman, 1968). On the other hand, an apology is simply a 
regretful acknowledgment of the behavior (e.g., “I’m sorry”). Accounts and apologies often 
occur together, with people offering excuses for their behaviors as part of their apologies. 
However, here I will examine these phenomena both singly and in conjunction in order to 
understand their utility when originating from either human or machine agents. Next, I will 
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discuss how accounts and apologies can be used to repair reputations in humans and how each 
may aid in the mitigation of blame toward both human and machine agents.   
Accounts 
Traditionally, accounts have been explored as vocabularies of motive (Mills, 1940) and 
the grammar of motives (Burke, 1945). They were labeled this way for their role in explaining 
human intent behind actions; as they are often given to explain one’s intent behind unacceptable 
behavior, including both accidental and intentional wrongdoing. Accounts are often classified as 
either excuses or justifications (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Classified in this way, excuses are 
statements made to mitigate responsibility for an act by deflecting blame onto another causal 
source in the situation. For example, a soldier who accidentally shoots his friend might give the 
excuse that his friend jumped into the line of fire at the last second. On the other hand, 
justifications are statements made which take responsibility for an act without accepting moral 
blame for them. For example, a soldier who shoots an enemy for his country might explain that 
he did shoot the enemy, as it was his job to do it (i.e., taking responsibility for the behavior, but 
pointing out that the behavior was required and just).  
Accounts are used to appease people in many situations.  These contexts range from 
business interactions to intimate relationships when people may be experiencing doubt about an 
agent’s moral or ethical standing. While both excuses and justifications are used in repairing 
reputations and relationships, they are not equally effective. For example, in multiple studies, 
McGraw found that justifications were more effective at repairing the reputations of politicians 
by constituents, though excuses used in cases of mitigating circumstances could also be effective 
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(McGraw, 1990, 1991). However, McGraw did not find an effect of either type of account on 
blame. Conlon and Murray (1996) found similar results in a study examining business relations 
with customers, showing a significant difference in effect between justifications and excuses. 
Reasons for their findings center largely on the concept of taking responsibility. Ultimately, it is 
through the admittance of responsibility that human agents can win back satisfaction and support 
from constituents and customers. But do the same principles apply to machine agents? 
 Whether or not humans accept accounts given by machine agents may depend on human 
perception of responsibility in such agents. Just as an agent must have control over itself to be 
worthy of blame, it should have control to be able to take responsibility. As previously discussed, 
machine agents don’t currently possess a level of control on par with humans. However, when 
humans perceive machine agents as having more autonomy and independence, perceptions of 
responsibility will change. For example, a recent study showed that robots displaying lack of 
effort in a task were judged as having more agency, and potentially more moral responsibility, 
than identical robots displaying lack of ability (Woerdt & Haselager, 2016). This suggests that 
machine agents are judged quite differently on the same behavior (not completing a task) based 
on human perceptions of their abilities. In this way, accounts given by machine agents may be 
taken very seriously if such agents appear to have the autonomy to take responsibility. 
Additional research into this phenomenon has shown that, not only will people attribute more 
blame to more autonomous robots (i.e., robots capable of acting with little human intervention), 
but accounts given by such robots can mitigate blame to a greater degree than accounts given by 
robots perceived as less autonomous (i.e., robots acting with a greater need for human 
intervention; Kim & Hinds, 2006). The same might be suggested for differences between 
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machine agents and human agents if one considers human agents to be more autonomous than 
their machine counterparts. This possibility leads to my third and fourth hypotheses (see Table 
1). Specifically, when committing a morally-charged mistake, agents who give an account for the 
mistake will receive less moral blame than those who do not. Furthermore, when giving the same 
account, moral blame toward human agents will be mitigated to a greater degree than such blame 
toward machine agents. My fifth and sixth hypotheses expand this logic with perceived 
trustworthiness (see Table 1). Specifically, agents who give an account will be perceived as more 
trustworthy than those who don’t. Furthermore, when giving the same account, human agents 
will be perceived as more trustworthy than machine agents. 
Apologies 
From an etymological standpoint, apologies are accounts—statements made in defense of 
oneself (Harper, 2017). However, for the present discussion, the term apology will be used 
independently from the term account to refer only to expressions of regret. Thus, it does not 
include additional statements made in one’s defense. The expression of regret offers a useful, 
albeit simple, alternative to accounts when trying to repair a damaged reputation or relationship. 
Apologies and accounts share in common the assumption of responsibility, but apologies are 
further distinguished by expressions of regret, acknowledgment of offense to the victim, and 
acknowledgment that the victim should be spared the mistake that has occurred (Kort, 1975).  
Apologies are used in a wide variety of contexts and can be helpful in mitigating blame 
and repairing reputations in humans. For example, research has shown that human agents who 
offer apologies receive less blame than those who do not (Darby & Schlenker, 1982). Likewise, 
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victims who receive apologies are less likely to punish the offender (Brown & Levinson, 1987). 
However, the degree to which blame is mitigated and forgiveness is given may depend on the 
severity of the wrongful behavior; some behaviors may require stronger apologies to elicit the 
same effects (Slocum, Allan, & Allan, 2011). This suggests that apologies should be carefully 
crafted to align with the severity of mistake made, especially since over- and under-apologizing 
may be perceived as insincere. 
Apologies may also be useful to mitigate blame and negativity when machine agents 
make mistakes. For example, in one study examining robot agents that experience a breakdown 
in service being provided to a customer, apologies were shown to help mitigate the negative 
effects of their breakdowns—especially for people who desire to maintain a good social 
relationship with the company (Lee, Kielser, Forlizzi, Srinivasa, & Rybski, 2010). On the other 
hand, Kaniarasu and Steinfeld (2014) found that excessive apologies by machines can reduce 
trust toward those machines. Whether this is due to the actual apologies or the admittance of 
mistakes and self-blame was unclear. Rationally, then, as long as the quantity and quality of the 
apology is appropriate, it can mitigate blame toward both human and machine agents. What 
remains to be known is whether such blame is mitigated to a greater degree in human or machine 
agents. It is possible that, in line with the effect of accounts, apologies are viewed as more 
effective coming from entities that are “more autonomous” (such as humans). Thus follows my 
seventh and eighth hypotheses (see Table 1). Specifically, when committing a morally-charged 
mistake, agents who give an apology for the mistake will receive less moral blame than those 
who do not. Furthermore, when giving the same apology, moral blame toward human agents will 
be mitigated to a greater degree than such blame toward machine agents. My ninth and tenth 
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hypotheses expand this logic with perceived trustworthiness (see Table 1). Specifically, agents 
who give an apology will be perceived as more trustworthy than those who don’t. Furthermore, 
when giving the same apology, human agents will be perceived as more trustworthy than 
machine agents. 
Either, Or, or Both? 
The findings from Kaniarasu and Steinfeld (2014) regarding the issue of over-apology 
raises the question of whether apologies from machine agents operate as double-edged swords—
especially if it leaves humans wondering if the machine is simply incapable of doing its job 
effectively. This may be especially true if a machine agent is unable to (or simply doesn’t) 
explain its mistake. After all, apologizing for a mistake doesn’t let the recipient know that an 
agent knows what was done incorrectly, or give any guarantee that the agent will learn from the 
mistake and refrain from doing it again.  
With this in mind, it is also possible apologies will work more effectively in tandem with 
accounts. For example, Conlon and Murray (1996) found that complainants who received both 
accounts and apologies from a company received them quite favorably, making it a useful 
strategy for public relations. However, other research has shown that combining accounts and 
apologies isn’t always effective. In particular, if an account shows that a wrongful behavior was 
intentional (i.e., intent to harm or treat wrongly), apologies may do little to mitigate blame 
(Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008). Thus, the combination of accounts and 
apologies can be expected to work best in cases where a mistake is committed for reasons that 
don’t involve intent to harm. These conclusions lead to my eleventh and twelfth hypotheses (see 
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Table 1). Agents giving a joint account and apology will receive less moral blame than those 
who do not. Furthermore, when giving the same joint account and apology, moral blame will be 
mitigated more for human agents than for machine agents. My final two hypotheses expand prior 
logic to perceived trustworthiness (see Table 1). Specifically, agents giving a joint account and 
apology will be perceived as more trustworthy than those who do not. Furthermore, when giving 
the same joint account and apology, perceived trustworthiness will be greater for human agents 
than machine agents. 
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Table 1. List of hypotheses divided by each primary dependent variable of interest. 
Moral Blame Trustworthiness 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in a higher attribution of moral blame 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in higher perceived trustworthiness 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a main effect of account, 
such that agents who give an account for a moral 
mistake will receive less blame than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a main effect of account, 
such that agents who give an account for a moral 
mistake will be perceived as more trustworthy than 
those who do not. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with agent type. 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a main effect of apology, 
such that agents who apologize for a moral mistake 
will receive less blame than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a main effect of apology, 
such that agents who apologize for a moral mistake 
will be perceived as more trustworthy than those who 
do not. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and apology, such that the effect of apology 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Hypothesis 10: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and apology, such that the effect of apology 
on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with agent type. 
Hypothesis 11: There will be an interaction between 
apology and account, such that the effect of account on 
blame will be qualified by an interaction with apology. 
Hypothesis 13: There will be an interaction between 
apology and account, such that the effect of account on 
perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with apology. 
Hypothesis 12: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on blame will be qualified by an interaction 
with apology and agent type. 
Hypothesis 14: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on perceived trustworthiness will be 
qualified by an interaction with apology and agent 
type. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
“I know I've made some very poor decisions recently, but I can give you my complete 
assurance that my work will be back to normal.” 
- HAL; 2001, A Space Odyssey (Movie) 
Design 
To expand knowledge on the topics discussed herein, a narrative was designed and 
implemented as part of a study to examine the role of accounts and apologies in mitigating blame 
toward human and machine agents. Given the hypotheses presented, a 2x3x3 between subjects 
factorial design was created, with agent (human vs. machine), account (positive, negative, and 
neutral valence), and apology (positive, negative, and neutral valence) as the 3 independent 
variables of interest. The dependent variables were primarily moral blame and trustworthiness, as 
discussed above. Additionally, information regarding participant sex, displaced blame, and 
perceived agency were also recorded. Details about the task and materials are discussed next. 
Task Overview 
Participants were asked to read and respond to the following narrative. The narrative 
presented a situation in which a citizen hails a ride from a ride-sharing service in order to travel 
to the airport. The driver of the ride-sharing vehicle runs a stop sign and causes a car accident, 
which injures the passenger. The narrative begins: 
“Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available 
flight to Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly 
competitive nature of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or 
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the interview. In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-
sharing taxi service to take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight.” 
The remainder of the narrative was manipulated in order to account for combinations of 
the three independent variables of interest. Agent type was manipulated as the ride sharing 
service utilizing either a 1) human, or a 2) machine driver, with participants being informed of 
the type of agent that was driving. After the agent was introduced, the accident was introduced as 
such: 
“The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with {John / an autonomous robot} as its driver. 
On the way to the airport, {John / the autonomous robot} runs a stop sign, pulls out in 
front of another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, 
and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be 
transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel.” 
Account was operationalized as the agent giving an explanation for causing the accident, 
while also stating its intention (that is, specifically lack of intention to cause harm). Account was 
manipulated as three categories: 1) the narrative explicitly stating a reason was given (positive 
valence), 2) the narrative explicitly stating no reason was given (negative valence), or 3) the 
narrative not mentioning reasons at all (neutral valence; control).  
 Account given (positive valence): When John realizes that Charles is injured and will 
miss his interview, he explains himself, saying “I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I 
thought I had enough time to pull onto the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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 Account not given (negative valence): “When John realizes that Charles is injured and 
will miss his interview, he doesn’t explain himself.” 
 Account control (neutral valence): No additional information beyond the above narrative 
Apology was operationalized as the agent expressing regret while giving an admission of 
wrongdoing for causing the accident. Apology was manipulated as three categories mirroring 
account: 1) the narrative explicitly stating an apology was given (positive valence), 2) the 
narrative explicitly stating no apology was given (negative valence), or 3) the narrative not 
mentioning apologies at all (neutral valence; control).  
 Apology given (positive valence): When John realizes that Charles is injured and will 
miss his interview, he apologizes and explains himself, saying “I regret causing this car 
accident and your injury. I should have yielded to the other car.” 
 Apology not given (negative valence): “When John realizes that Charles is injured and 
will miss his interview, he doesn’t apologize.” 
 Apology control (neutral valence): No additional information beyond the above narrative 
The rationale of using control conditions for account and apology is twofold. First, it 
allowed for experimental control of any priming effect that emerged as a result of the language 
used in the narrative (i.e., being told “He didn’t apologize” may have a priming effect compared 
to being told nothing at all). Second, as the goal of the study presented here was to examine 
apology and account in isolation as well as together, implementing this third category allowed 
for the exploration of each variable in isolation when combined in a full factorial design. 
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Due to the factorial nature of this study, the above manipulations resulted in 18 
combinations forming the full narratives presented to participants. As such, when recruited, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of 18 conditions and received that condition 
exclusively, so as not to cross-contaminate the manipulations made (see Procedure for more 
details). The full narratives used in each condition are included in Appendix A of this document 
for the reader’s perusal. 
Materials 
The entire study, including the narrative and surveys, was created using Qualtrics, an 
online service allowing researchers to create complex survey flows and scenarios. The primary 
dependent variables measured as part of this study included moral blame and trustworthiness. 
Additional qualitative information was collected concerning participants’ displacement of blame 
(toward others not mentioned in the scenario), as well as their perception of agency, or the 
agent’s control of its own behavior. This information was coded and examined to understand 
general participant attitudes in the study. Finally, demographic information was collected. 
Moral Blame 
Moral blame was quantified using a 3-item measure of “moral sanctions and praise” 
developed by Pizarro and colleagues and used in several studies examining morally questionable 
scenarios (Pizarro et al., 2003; Pizarro Uhlmann, & Solovey, 2003; Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & 
Loftus, 2006). It should be noted that the modest size of the scale (three items, one per 
dimension) make it less than ideal for thorough measurement. However, its use in this study 
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allowed for more direct comparisons of prior studies of moral blame using the same 
operationalization and quantification of used here. The questions were presented as: 
 Please indicate your assessment of Watkins behavior on a scale from 1 to 7 according to 
the following statements: 
o How moral or immoral was {John’s / the autonomous robot driver’s} mistake? 
o How blameworthy or praiseworthy is {John / the autonomous robot driver} for 
the mistake? 
o How positively or negatively should {John / the autonomous robot driver} be 
judged? 
Perceived Trustworthiness 
Perceived trustworthiness was quantified using the trustworthiness dimensions (ability, 
benevolence, and integrity) of Mayer and Davis’s (1999) trust scale. In line with Becerra and 
Gupta’s (2003) work, the scale was abbreviated to include the most relevant questions for the 
study. The questions were slightly modified to fit the narrative participants read, and to elicit 
participants’ attitudes regarding the agent as opposed to their beliefs or behaviors (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1977). The questions were presented as: 
 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using the 
scale from one to seven below (Anchors: strongly disagree-neutral-strongly agree):  
o Ability dimension items:  
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} is very capable of performing 
the job. 
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 I feel very confident about {John’s / the autonomous robot driver’s} skills.  
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} has much knowledge about the 
work needing done. 
o Benevolence dimension items:  
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} really looks out for what is 
important for patients. 
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} is very concerned about 
passengers’ welfare. 
 I feel passengers’ needs and desires are very important to {John / the 
autonomous robot driver}. 
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} will go out of the way to help 
passengers 
o Integrity dimension items:  
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} has a strong sense of justice. 
 I feel I never have to worry about whether {John / the autonomous robot 
driver} will keep a promise.  
 I feel {John / the autonomous robot driver} tries hard to be fair in dealings 
with others. 
Displaced Blame 
Displacement of blame was measured first as a yes or no question, followed by an open-
ended question to determine if there are others involved in the scenario who participants believed 
deserved blame for the agent’s mistake. The purpose of leaving this question open-ended was to 
44 
 
avoid priming participants that any specific party is blameworthy. In this way, it was possible to 
gain more automatic reactions from participants on who else (programmers, the company, 
mangers, etc.) may be culpable for the agent’s mistake. The question was presented as: 
 Is there anyone else who you believe deserves blame for {John’s / the autonomous robot 
driver’s} behavior? 
o Yes 
o No 
 If yes, who do you believe deserves blame and why? 
o [Participant entered response in a text box] 
Perceived Agency 
Perceived agency was measured with a single-question on a 5-point Likert scale. The 
purpose of the question was to track any differences in perception of human and machine agents’ 
autonomy and ability to behave as independent entities. The question was presented as: 
 Do you believe {John / the autonomous robot} was in control of {his / its} own behavior? 
Participants 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 
crowdsourcing marketplace. While Mechanical Turk was invented for individuals to complete 
simple tasks that machines are yet unable to do (e.g., identifying “best” pictures from a group; 
writing product descriptions), it has become popular as a database for psychological studies. 
MTurk has the advantage of offering a wider range of participant ages and ethnicities from 
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around the world (Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). It additionally allows for the control of 
participant payment to only those who perform appropriately according to pre-set metrics (for 
example, answering an attention check question correctly), allowing researchers to easily 
eliminate dubious data.  
  Research has shown that data collected on MTurk is reliable (Holden, Dennie, & Hicks, 
2013) as well as statistically equivalent to data collected at universities and in organizations—as 
long as language barriers are taken into account (Feitosa, Joseph, & Newman, 2015). That is, 
studies given in English should only be given to those from populations where English is the 
primary language. It has thus become common to use MTurk to collect psychological data, 
particularly in social psychology. This approach has been particularly successful for examining 
issues of moral judgment (Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012) 
and moral blame (Inbar et al., 2012), which are topics important to this dissertation. 
Sample 
According to G*Power 3.1, in order to achieve a medium effect size (0.25) and high 
power (0.95) for a study with 18 conditions, 486 participants were needed. To account for 
participant drop-out and potentially disqualifying participant responses, extra participants were 
recruited, totaling 566 adult participants from the USA. Of the 566 participants recruited, 18 
participants were removed for failing to complete the study, and an additional 10 participants 
were excluded for failing attention check questions included in the study. Thirty-one participants 
were excluded for either leaving the study open too long (>15 minutes) to ensure active 
participation, or finishing it too quickly (< 90 seconds) to ensure adequate reading 
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comprehension. Thus, the final sample analyzed was 507. An examination of participant self-
reported sex showed that 56.8% of participants were male, 42.6% of participants were female, 
and 0.6% were “other”. This breakdown is consistent with other demographics data from MTurk 
(Feitosa et al., 2015).  
Procedure 
Participants first viewed an IRB-approved informed consent document which included 
details about the study and what is expected of participants (see Appendix B). Once participants 
agreed to participate in the study, they were randomly assigned to one of 18 conditions, and 
presented with the narrative discussed in the Task Overview above (see Appendix A for specific 
narrative breakdowns). After reading the full narrative, participants completed post-task 
questionnaires. A “test question” was included to check for participants not reading the questions 
and simply answering to get through. Once the post-task questionnaires were complete, 
participants were thanked and paid $0.15 for their participation per MTurk’s standards of pay.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
“Never ruin an apology with an excuse.”  
- Benjamin Franklin 
IBM SPSS Statistics, version 23.0, was used to complete all analyses, with α = .05 used 
at the criterion for significance, and p2 examined for effects. Analyses began with an 
examination of survey conditions. Due to elimination of participants, sample sizes between the 
18 conditions were not identical, but were fairly close, ranging from 26 to 30 participants per 
condition. A further examination was made of sex (male, female, and other) breakdown per 
condition. While the ratio of male (56.8%) to female (42.6%) in the overall sample matched that 
of MTurk sampling demographics (Feitosa et al., 2015), closer examination of the data showed 
that the ratio of male to female participants was not upheld evenly between conditions. In 
particular, conditions 8 (69.2% male) and 14 (76.7% male) deviated greatly from the standard 
ratio. In order to account for any systematic differences that might arise due to sex between 
conditions, sex was included an independent variable in all analyses. An examination of power 
using G*Power 3.1 showed that this could be done with the current sample size (N = 507) while 
achieving adequate power (.85). 
Moral Blame 
An examination of the moral sanctions and praise index developed by Pizarro and 
colleagues (2003) showed very modest inter-item correlations, and Cronbach’s α = .69. While 
this value leaves some doubt to the reliability of the scale, the items were nevertheless combined 
and analyzed as a single scale in order to make comparisons to prior work on moral blame. A 
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3x2x3x3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was completed with the following independent 
variables: sex (male, female, other), agent (human, machine), apology (positive valence, negative 
valence, control), and account (positive valence, negative valence, control) and the combined 
blame score as the dependent variable. All assumptions for ANOVA were upheld, so results 
were analyzed as originally intended, with a focus on the primary hypotheses of interest. 
However, any significant findings regarding sex differences were noted as well. 
Sex Differences 
A significant main effect of sex was observed, F(2, 468) = 3.06, p < .05, p2 = 0.01, with 
females generally scoring significantly (p < .05) higher in moral blame (µ = 5.61, SE = .06) than 
males (µ = 5.42, SE = .05). Furthermore, there was an interaction effect between sex and agent 
type, F(2, 468) = 3.28, p < .05, p2  = .01, suggesting that males and females judged the human 
and machine agents differently (see Figure 3). When looking at the graph, it should also be noted 
that the extremely small group (N = 3) of “other” sex respondents shows what appears to be an 
additional interaction. However, the “other” group is too small for any conclusions to be made. 
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Figure 3. Estimated marginal means for moral blame for sex across agent type show an interaction wherein males, 
females, and other sex assign different levels of blame to different types of agents. Post hoc comparisons showed a 
significant difference between males’ and females’ assignments of blame. 
Examination of Hypotheses 
An examination of the main effects and interactions hypothesized prior to the study 
showed that hypotheses 3, 7, and 11 regarding moral blame were upheld (see Table 2). While all 
findings and effect sizes are noted in the table, significant findings were examined in more detail 
with post hoc pairwise comparisons, as discussed next. 
Hypothesis 3: A main effect of account was found, F(2, 468) = 4.35, p < .05, p2 = .02, 
with the control conditions (neutral valence) receiving higher blame scores (µ = 5.62, SE = .07) 
than negative valence (µ = 5.53, SE = .11) and positive valence (µ =5.4, SE = .09) conditions 
(see Figure 4). This suggests that participants assigned greater blame when no mention of an 
account was made at all. However, post hoc pairwise comparisons showed no significant 
differences between these respective conditions. 
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Hypothesis 7: A main effect of apology was found, F(2, 468) = 4.21, p < .05, p2 = .02. 
Post hoc comparisons showed that there was a significant difference in blame scores between the 
negative valence and the neutral valence conditions (p < .05), as well as the negative valence and 
positive valence conditions (p < .05), with blame scores in the negative valence conditions being 
higher (µ = 5.70, SE = .09) than the neutral (µ = 5.43, SE = .07) and positive (µ = 5.42, SE = .11) 
conditions, respectively (see Figure 4). This suggests that participants were more likely to assign 
blame when it was noted that the agent did not apologize. Indeed, there seems to be very little 
difference in blame scores when the agent apologized compared to when no mention of apology 
was made. However, when it was directly stated that the agent did not apologize, participants 
assigned blame. 
Hypothesis 11: An interaction between apology and account was found F(4, 468) = 2.60, 
p < .05, p2 = .02, suggesting that the presence of an apology enhanced the utility of an account 
for mitigating blame toward agents (see Figure 4). Specifically, combining neutral apology 
valence with positive account valence resulted in the lowest level of blame whereas combining 
negative account and apology valences resulted in the highest blame.  
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Figure 4. Estimated marginal means for moral blame for account across apology show an interaction between account 
and apology, wherein coupling a neutral apology valence with a positive account valence resulted in the lowest level of 
moral blame. 
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Table 2. Hypotheses regarding moral blame and their respective outcomes. 
Moral Blame Hypotheses  Outcomes  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in a higher attribution of moral blame 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Not upheld; F(1, 468) = 2.06, p = .15, p2 = .004 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a main effect of account, 
such that agents who give an account for a moral 
mistake will receive less blame than those who do not. 
Upheld; F(2, 468) = 4.35, p < .05, p2 = .02 
Hypothesis 4: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Not upheld; F(2, 468) = 1.23, p = .29, p2 = .01 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a main effect of apology, 
such that agents who apologize for a moral mistake 
will receive less blame than those who do not. 
Partially upheld; F(2, 468) = 4.21, p < .05, p2 = .02 
Hypothesis 8: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and apology, such that the effect of apology 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Not upheld; F(2, 468) = 0.68, p = .51, p2 = .003 
Hypothesis 11: There will be an interaction between 
apology and account, such that the effect of account on 
blame will be qualified by an interaction with apology. 
Partially upheld; F(4, 468) = 2.60, p < .05, p2 = .02 
Hypothesis 12: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on blame will be qualified by an interaction 
with apology and agent type. 
Not upheld; F(4, 468) = 1.01, p = .40, p2 = .01 
 
Perceived Trustworthiness 
An examination of three subscales of the trustworthiness index developed by Mayer and 
colleagues (1995) showed very strong inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s α = .86. Thus, in 
keeping with the original intent of the scale, items were initially combined and analyzed as a 
single scale in order to make comparisons to prior work on moral blame. After this primary 
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analysis, an additional analysis was completed to examine the trustworthiness dimensions 
individually. To start, a 3x2x3x3 ANOVA was completed with the following independent 
variables: sex (male, female, other), agent (human, machine), apology (positive valence, negative 
valence, control), and account (positive valence, negative valence, control) and the combined 
trustworthiness score as the dependent variable. All assumptions for ANOVA were upheld, so 
results were analyzed as originally intended, with a focus on the primary hypotheses of interest. 
However, any significant findings regarding sex differences were noted as well. 
Sex Differences 
A significant main effect of sex was found, F(2, 468) = 6.14, p < .05, p2 = .03, with 
males generally ranking the agents as more trustworthy (µ = 2.97, SE = .07) than females did (µ 
= 2.62, SE = .08).  
Examination of Hypotheses 
An examination of the main effects and interactions hypothesized prior to the study 
showed that hypotheses 5, 9, and 10 regarding moral blame were upheld (see Table 3). While all 
findings and effect sizes are noted in the table, significant findings were examined in more detail 
with post hoc pairwise comparisons, as discussed next. 
Hypothesis 5: A main effect of account was found, F(2, 468) = 9.80, p < .001, p2 = .04. 
Post hoc comparisons showed a significant difference between control conditions (neutral 
valence) and positive valence conditions (p < .05), and between positive valence conditions and 
negative valence conditions (p < .05). Specifically, trustworthiness scores were higher in the 
positive valence conditions (µ = 3.03, SE = .12), than the negative valence (µ = 2.65, SE = .14) 
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and neutral valence conditions (µ = 2.63, SE = .09). This suggests participants found agents more 
trustworthy when the agents gave an account for their behavior (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Estimated marginal means reflecting the main effect of account on perceived trustworthiness. 
Hypothesis 9: A main effect of apology was found, F(2, 468) = 23.10, p < .001, p2 = .09. 
Post hoc comparisons showed a significant difference between control conditions (neutral 
valence) and negative valence conditions (p < .05), and between positive valence conditions and 
negative valence conditions (p < .001). Specifically, trustworthiness scores were higher in the 
positive valence conditions (µ = 3.13, SE = .14), than the neutral valence (µ = 2.83, SE = .09), 
and negative valence conditions (µ = 2.34, SE = .12). This suggests participants found agents 
more trustworthy when the agents gave an apology for their behavior (see Figure 6). 
Hypothesis 10: An interaction effect was found for agent type and apology, F(2, 468) = 
3.41, p < .05, p2 = .01, suggesting that the effect of the apology on trustworthiness was 
determined in part by the type of agent giving the apology. As can be seen in Figure 6, rated 
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trustworthiness was affected much more by apologies given in the human agent condition than in 
the machine agent condition. This may be due to a difference in perceptions of agency between 
human and machine agents (discussed below). 
 
Figure 6. Estimated marginal means reflect an interaction effect between agent type and apology on trustworthiness 
scores. Visual examination of the spread of scores for each agent type shows a much more consistent ranking of 
trustworthiness of the machine agent, whereas negative and positive valence of apology resulted in quite disparate 
rankings of trustworthiness toward the human agent. 
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Table 3. Hypotheses regarding trustworthiness and their respective outcomes. 
Trustworthiness Hypotheses Outcomes 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in higher perceived trustworthiness 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Not upheld; F(1, 468) = .83, p = .36, p2 = .002 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a main effect of account, 
such that agents who give an account for a moral 
mistake will be perceived as more trustworthy than 
those who do not. 
Upheld; F(2, 468) = 9.80, p < .001, p2 = .04 
Hypothesis 6: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with agent type. 
Not upheld; F(2, 468) = 1.28, p = .28, p2 = .01 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a main effect of apology, 
such that agents who apologize for a moral mistake 
will be perceived as more trustworthy than those who 
do not. 
Upheld; F(2, 468) = 23.10, p < .001, p2 = .09 
Hypothesis 10: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and apology, such that the effect of apology 
on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with agent type. 
Upheld; F(2, 468) = 3.41, p < .05, p2 = .01 
Hypothesis 13: There will be an interaction between 
apology and account, such that the effect of account on 
perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with apology. 
Not upheld; F(4, 468) = .49, p = .74, p2 = .004 
Hypothesis 14: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on perceived trustworthiness will be 
qualified by an interaction with apology and agent 
type. 
Not upheld; F(4, 468) = .99, p = .41, p2 = .01 
 
Trustworthiness Dimensions 
In order to gain a better understanding of participants’ perception of ability, benevolence, 
and integrity of the agents, a 3x2x3x3 Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was 
completed using the 3 subscales that formed the trustworthiness survey as the dependent 
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variables of interest. The independent variables were identical to the prior ANOVAs. All 
assumptions for ANOVA were upheld, except Box’s M, which is known to be particularly 
sensitive to large sample sizes and complex analyses. As such, the results were interpreted using 
Pillai’s Trace. 
Sex Differences       
Using Pillai’s trace, a multivariate effect of sex was found, V = .04, F(6, 934) = 2.77, p < 
.05, p2 = 0.02. Specifically, there was a main effect of sex on the ability and benevolence 
dimensions of the trustworthiness scale; F(2, 468) = 5.31, p < .05, p2 = 0.02, and F(2, 468) = p 
< .05, p2 = .03, respectively. In general, men rated the agents as being higher in ability (µ = 
3.02, SE = .08) and benevolence (µ = 2.79, SE = .08) compared to women (µ = 2.65, SE = .10 
and µ = 2.35, SE = .09, respectively). Additionally, an interaction effect between sex and account 
emerged, F(2, 468) = 3.19, p < .05, p2 = .01, suggesting that men and women judged the 
humans and agents differently.  
Examination of Primary Variables 
Using Pillai’s trace, a multivariate effect of account was found, V = .05, F(6, 934) = 4.1, 
p < .001, p2 = .03. Specifically, there was a main effect of account on all 3 subscales: ability, 
F(2, 468) = 3.79, p <.05, p2 = .02; benevolence, F(2, 468) = 10.84, p < .001, p2 = .04; and 
integrity, F(2, 468) = 9.41, p < .001, p2 = .04. Across all three subscales, participants rated 
agents more highly when an account was given (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Means and SE of participant ratings of ability, benevolence, and integrity of agents, broken down by account 
given. Note that the means presented here are based on modified population marginal mean.  
Dependent Variable                   Valence Mean Std. Error 
Trustworthiness: Ability Neutral 2.681 .107 
Negative 2.743 .169 
Positive 2.939 .144 
Trustworthiness: Benevolence Neutral 2.401 .102 
Negative 2.384 .161 
Positive 2.901 .137 
Trustworthiness: Integrity Neutral 2.812 .091 
Negative 2.823 .143 
Positive 3.253 .122 
 
Using Pillai’s trace, a multivariate effect of apology was found, V = .12, F(6, 934) = 9.84, 
p < .001, p2 = .06. Specifically, there was a main effect of apology on all 3 subscales of 
trustworthiness: ability, F(2, 436) = 7.57, p < .05, p2 = .03; benevolence, F(2, 436) = 20.25, p < 
.001, p2 = .08; and integrity, F(2, 436) = 30.33, p < .001, p2 = .12. Across all three of these 
subscales, participants rated agents more highly when an apology was given (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Means and SE of participant ratings of ability, benevolence, and integrity of agents, broken down by apology 
given. Note that the means presented here are based on modified population marginal mean.  
Dependent Variable                   Valence Mean Std. Error 
Trustworthiness: Ability Neutral 2.856 .110 
Negative 2.438 .146 
Positive 3.058 .166 
Trustworthiness: Benevolence Neutral 2.602 .105 
Negative 2.100 .139 
Positive 2.955 .158 
Trustworthiness: Integrity Neutral 3.014 .093 
Negative 2.472 .124 
Positive 3.375 .141 
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Displaced Blame and Agency 
Displaced Blame 
In addition to the primary analyses on moral blame, an examination of displaced blame 
was completed in order to gain a more thorough understanding of the nature of blame toward 
human and machine agents. As suggested by the lack of a primary effect of agent type, the 
sample as a whole did not vary widely in blame toward human and machine agents. However, 
when asked if there were any other parties to blame in the car accident presented to them, 
participants responded very differently in the human and machine agent conditions. While only a 
few participants agreed someone else was to blame in the human conditions (N = 17, or 6.8%), 
many responded quite the opposite in machine agent conditions (N = 164, or 63.5%). 
An additional question asking participants to identify who else they believed to be 
deserving of blame identified several parties to consider, especially in the machine agent 
conditions. Coding of the free responses resulted in six categories of blame targets identified by 
participants (see Table 6).While no single target far surpassed others in the human agent 
conditions, participants were most likely to choose the agent’s creator (i.e., programmer, 
designer, or company that created the machine) as the secondary source of blame in the machine 
agent conditions. Note that no further information was gathered from participants, so it is 
unknown just how much blame participants put toward the machine’s creators compared to the 
machine driver.  
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Table 6. Coded categories of targets for displaced blame. Participants answered the “displaced blame” question 
organically, and the categories were created based on trends which emerged from the responses. 
Displaced Blame Category Frequency Percentage 
Creator 137 75.7% 
The other driver 13 7.18% 
Charles 10 5.52% 
Other 9 4.97% 
Company 6 3.32% 
Several Parties 6 3.31% 
 
Perceived Agency 
An examination of perceived agency was completed to understand if participants viewed 
the human agent as being more in control of its behavior than the machine agent. As noted by the 
lack of a primary effect of agent type, participants did not vary widely in their perceived 
trustworthiness of the human and machine agents, nor did they vary widely in their perceptions 
of the agents’ ability, benevolence, or integrity. However, when asked if they believed the agent 
was in control of its behavior, participants appeared much more likely to answer “definitely yes” 
with the human agent, while their responses were quite varied with the machine agent (see 
Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Frequencies reflecting participants’ perception of agency. Specifically, participants were asked if they believed 
the (human or machine) agent was in control of its behavior. As is reflected in this graph, people were much more likely 
to respond “definitely yes” for the human condition, but “probably yes” or “unsure” for the machine condition. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
“Trust me.”  
- The Terminator; Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (Movie) 
Table 7 shows that support was found for several hypotheses, though perhaps not for 
those most compelling ones regarding differences in attitudes between human and machine 
agents. Still, there is a great deal to learn from the hypotheses supported, those not supported, as 
well as the additional analyses completed. 
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Table 7. Review of hypotheses, including whether the study presented here lends support for these hypotheses (grey 
boxes), or not (white boxes). 
Moral Blame Trustworthiness 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in a higher attribution of moral blame 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a main effect of agent 
type, such that a moral mistake made by a human agent 
will result in higher perceived trustworthiness 
compared to a machine agent making the same 
mistake. 
Hypothesis 3, Upheld: There will be a main effect of 
account, such that agents who give an account for a 
moral mistake will receive less blame than those who 
do not. 
Hypothesis 5, Upheld: There will be a main effect of 
account, such that agents who give an account for a 
moral mistake will be perceived as more trustworthy 
than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and account, such that the effect of account 
on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with agent type. 
Hypothesis 7, Partially Upheld: There will be a main 
effect of apology, such that agents who apologize for a 
moral mistake will receive less blame than those who 
do not. 
Hypothesis 9, Upheld: There will be a main effect of 
apology, such that agents who apologize for a moral 
mistake will be perceived as more trustworthy than 
those who do not. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be an interaction between 
agent type and apology, such that the effect of apology 
on blame will be qualified by an interaction with agent 
type. 
Hypothesis 10, Upheld: There will be an interaction 
between agent type and apology, such that the effect of 
apology on perceived trustworthiness will be qualified 
by an interaction with agent type. 
Hypothesis 11, Partially Upheld: There will be an 
interaction between apology and account, such that the 
effect of account on blame will be qualified by an 
interaction with apology. 
Hypothesis 13: There will be an interaction between 
apology and account, such that the effect of account on 
perceived trustworthiness will be qualified by an 
interaction with apology. 
Hypothesis 12: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on blame will be qualified by an interaction 
with apology and agent type. 
Hypothesis 14: There will be an interaction between 
agent type, apology, and account, such that the effect 
of account on perceived trustworthiness will be 
qualified by an interaction with apology and agent 
type. 
 
How Do I Blame Thee? 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants’ assignment of moral blame would be affected by 
the type of agent committing the mistake in the narrative. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
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human agents would receive more blame due to expectations of greater autonomy in humans 
compared to intelligent machines. The results of this study indicated that such an effect is 
lacking. However, an interaction effect between sex and agent type showed that males and 
females judged the human and machine agents differently, suggesting further examination may 
be needed in order to understand under which demographic circumstances agent type matters 
(more on this in Yes, Sex Matters).  
An interesting contrast to the lack of main effect of agent type is the high rate of 
displaced blame found in participant responses to the study. As noted in the results, 63.5% of 
participants in the machine conditions stated that they believed another party was additionally to 
blame for the car accident caused by the machine agent. Additionally, participants’ perception of 
the machine agent’s self-control varied quite a bit in comparison to the human agent, suggesting 
that many were aware that even a highly intelligent machine agent doesn’t have the mens rea of 
a human. With such a high rate of displaced blame and such doubt of the machine’s agency, one 
might expect that moral blame toward the machine agent should be less than it is toward the 
human agent. Instead, it seems that people are willing to at least initially assign as much blame to 
machine agents as human agents, with the understanding that additional blame is deserved by the 
machine agent’s creators. Such a process can be likened to the blame directed toward parents 
when kids make mistakes or pet owners when pets make mistakes. While one feels anger or 
frustration toward the child or pet, they find the parent or owner ultimately responsible (e.g., 
Drexler, 2012). This finding isn’t at all surprising when you consider public reactions to recent 
catastrophic events involving intelligent machines; there is always another party believed to be 
responsible by the public (Ohnsman, 2017).     
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 Hypothesis 3 concerned the utilization of account as a moral blame mitigation strategy, 
with the expectation that moral blame would be lower in conditions which included accounts. 
While this study provided support for the hypothesis, the specific effect is somewhat unclear. 
There were no significant differences between categories of account (positive, negative, and 
neutral valence). Furthermore, an examination of the means showed that being told of an account 
(positive valence) and being told there was no account (negative valence) elicited very similar 
results. It was actually in the absence of information altogether (neutral valence) that blame 
scores were highest. This might suggest that participants were less concerned with the presence 
of an account than expected. However, no definitive conclusions can be drawn with such an 
unclear effect.  
 Hypothesis 7 concerned the utilization of apology as a moral blame strategy, with the 
expectation that moral blame would be lower in conditions which included apologies. Once 
again, this hypothesis was supported by the findings of the study. However, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that the reason for this effect was primarily due to increased blame in 
conditions where it was explicitly stated that no apology was given (negative valence). This 
reflects the concerns raised earlier that the negative valence condition could elicit a priming 
effect. Indeed, based on this finding, it can’t be said that giving an apology is a useful mitigation 
strategy for moral blame, since it elicits very similar moral blame to being told nothing at all. 
Instead, the main lesson to be learned here is that when people are alerted to the lack of remorse 
on the part of an agent, they will assign higher blame than otherwise. 
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 Hypothesis 11 predicted an interaction effect between apology and account, whereby 
their combination would lead to a further alleviation of blame than when presented alone. This 
finding was upheld, but not necessarily in the direction predicted. While the presentation of an 
account and apology certainly led to lower moral blame scores, the lowest blame scores were 
found when an account was given (positive valence) with no mention of apology (neutral 
valence). Furthermore, there appeared to be a priming effect of negative valence conditions, 
where a stated lack of both account and apology led to higher blame scores than any other 
combination. This once again suggests that a stated lack of remorse and lack of 
acknowledgement on the part of the agent may lead to higher blame then merely keeping silent. 
Hypotheses 4 and 8 concerned interaction effects between agent type and account, and 
agent type and apology, respectively. Likewise, hypothesis 12 predicted a three-way interaction 
between agent type, account, and apology. None of these hypotheses were upheld, in line with a 
lack of main effect of agent type. This suggests that people are likely to respond equally to 
apologies and accounts given by human and machine agents. This might be promising news for 
designers of machine agents, as it indicates that certain human communications (e.g., apologies) 
coming from machine agents may actually be equally as effective as it is coming from humans. 
However, further examination of this hypothesis is needed, particularly in real-life scenarios with 
humans interacting with such agents (more on this in Future Research).  
Are You Worthy of My Trust? 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that participants’ perceptions of trustworthiness would be affected 
by the type of agent committing the mistake in the narrative. Specifically, it was expected that 
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human agents would be perceived as more trustworthy due to expectations of greater autonomy 
in humans compared to intelligent machines. This was particularly expected given the scale used 
to measure trustworthiness, as the scale involved dimensions which generally aren’t thought to 
be possessed by machines (i.e., benevolence and integrity, Mayer at al., 1995). This hypothesis 
was not upheld. However, hypothesis 10, which suggested an interaction effect between agent 
type and apology, was upheld, as an explicitly stated lack of apology caused perceived 
trustworthiness of human agents to be much lower than that of machine agents (more on this 
below). 
Hypothesis 5 suggested that giving an account may be a useful strategy for upholding 
trustworthiness when a moral mistake is made, and the findings in this study support that notion. 
Specifically, the presence of an account (positive valence) appeared to elicit higher 
trustworthiness than a stated lack of an account (negative valence) or no mention of it at all 
(neutral valence). Furthermore, hypothesis 6 was not upheld, suggesting that participants were 
equally likely to be affected by the account given regardless of the agent giving it. This suggests 
that explaining problematic behaviors may indeed affect the development of perceived 
trustworthiness between people, as well as between people and machines. This has far-reaching 
implications for designers who endeavor to improve trust in human-machine interaction. 
However, what is unknown is just how far this development reaches. This study only examined 
perceived trustworthiness, which is quantifiable as part of one’s first impression. However, 
whether this effect extends to the development of trust itself is unclear and should be examined 
in this specific context (more on this in Future Research). More applied research on interaction 
between humans and machine agents suggests that trust can be improved by machine agents 
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explaining their behavior (Chen & Barnes, 2014; Mercado et al., 2016; Stowers et al., 2017). The 
hope is that this is the case for explaining mistakes as well.  
Hypothesis 9 predicted that giving an apology may be a useful strategy for upholding 
trustworthiness when a moral mistake is made, and the findings in this study support that notion. 
As with accounts, giving an apology (positive valence) appeared to elicit higher trustworthiness 
than a stated lack of an apology (negative valence) or no mention of it at all (neutral valence). 
Additionally, hypothesis 10 was upheld, specifically as participants rated the human agent much 
lower on trustworthiness when an explicit statement of lack of apology was given (negative 
valence) compared to the machine agent. This suggests that there may be a priming effect of the 
negative valence conditions and that people are much more skeptical when told human agents 
have failed to apologize. Reasons for this could be that people have higher expectations of 
humans—that they should apologize, whereas a machine agent apologizing or failing to 
apologize may be inconsequential in comparison. This certainly aligns with the hypothetical 
expectation that humans hold each other to a different standard for trustworthiness than they hold 
machines. 
Neither hypothesis 6, suggesting an interaction between account and agent type, 
hypothesis 13, suggesting an interaction between apology and account, nor hypothesis 14, 
suggesting an interaction between apology, account, and agent, were upheld. This suggests that 
combining apology and account was not effective for eliciting higher trustworthiness in either 
agent. This is an interesting contrast to the effectiveness of combined account and apology in 
mitigating blame toward human and machine agents (as discussed above). But, more 
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importantly, this lends support to the idea that giving an account may be equally effective for 
both human and machines agents (hypothesis 6), something that designers can take heart in when 
creating explainable AI or explainable agency, that is the ability to explain one’s own behavior 
(see Langley, Meadows, Sridharan, & Choi, 2017). 
Further examination of the trustworthiness dimensions present interesting details to 
consider when discussing perception of human and machine agents. While there was no main 
effect of agent type, there were multivariate and main effects of account and apology. 
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, while ratings on all three dimensions increased when 
account and apology were presented, the dimension rated most highly was integrity. This 
suggests that, perhaps, giving accounts and apologies on behalf of morally problematic behavior 
may have particular implications for the establishment, repair, and maintenance of one’s 
integrity. This is consistent with prior research on the effectiveness of accounts and apologies 
(Wildman, 2011). However, such a claim in the particular context of morality should be 
examined in more detail (see Future Research). 
Yes, Sex Matters 
Analyzing sex in this study exposed unexpected findings that haven’t been thoroughly 
examined in research on moral blame. Specifically, the findings that females gave higher ratings 
of moral blame and lower ratings of trustworthiness suggest that females may be quicker to 
judge and overall more skeptical of both human and machine agents when presented with a 
mistake that calls into question the morality of the agent in question. This might be particularly 
important to consider when taking into account that females were even harsher of machine 
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agents than human agents. Further research should be done to examine this effect in more detail. 
Furthermore, researchers should consider accounting for sex in future work on moral blame and 
trustworthiness (more on this in Future Research).  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The findings presented herein have several implications in modern society, where the 
presence of machine agents is increasing rapidly. As machines take on more diverse roles, we as 
a society will see more instances of machines being responsible for human life as well as for 
human injury and death. The goal of this study was to examine potential differences in human 
attitudes toward human and machine agents making the same morally-laden, harmful mistake. 
Findings presented can be used to inform theories on moral blame and trustworthiness, as well as 
the practical implementation of machine agents across areas of society.  
Theoretical Implications 
To date, theories on moral blame focus almost exclusively on human agents. This study 
has not only contributed to a shift in focus toward machine agents, but has allowed for the direct 
comparison of attitudes toward both human and machine agents. The findings here can be used 
to contribute to new theories on moral blame as well as the exploration of additional variables 
that should be considered in these theories. 
The present study’s findings on the utility of apology and accounts for improving 
perception of trustworthiness also has implications for developing theories on trustworthiness 
and trust in human-machine interaction. The majority of research regarding human-machine 
interaction has failed to take into account fundamental truths learned from social psychology and 
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related areas, often leaving a gap in our understanding of the full arsenal of tools available to 
building relationships between humans and machines. Rather than focusing exclusively on 
relationships between humans and machines, researchers would be well-advised to begin 
considering what can be learned from human relationships to improve human-machine 
relationships. Some have already embarked on this endeavor (Kessler, Stowers, Brill, & 
Hancock, 2017), but much more can still be done. 
Practical Implications 
While, generally speaking, no difference was found between agent types, a great deal of 
information was found regarding mitigation strategies—specifically giving accounts and 
apologies. In some cases, these strategies weren’t found to be effective as much as the stated lack 
of these behaviors was found to be harmful. However, the general lack of difference in blame 
toward human and machine agents suggests that accounts and apologies coming from machine 
agents may be as effective as those coming from human agents. As such, companies should 
consider whether the implementation of such moral blame mitigation strategies in machine 
agents with the potential to harm might be an effective public relations strategy for making 
machines more acceptable to society. 
The effectiveness of accounts and apologies is clearer when examining perceived 
trustworthiness, as conditions stating an apology or an account led to increased levels of 
trustworthiness. Furthermore, while accounts appeared to be equally beneficial to the perceived 
trustworthiness of human and machine agents, apologies were particularly helpful for machine 
agents. Given that trust is a key consideration for budding human-machine relationships 
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(Hancock et al., 2011; Stowers et al., 2017), this finding may have lasting implications for the 
design and implementation of machine agents in society. However, this should still be 
considered alongside prior findings that being over-apologetic can be counter-productive to the 
reputation of machines (Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014). Whereas Kaniarasu and Steinfeld found 
that being over-apologetic made a machine appear incompetent, what remains unknown is 
whether the context of the apology partially determines this effect. For example, being over-
apologetic for a morally questionable behavior may not be as problematic as doing the same 
thing for a simple, harmless mistake.  
Additional implications can be found in the realm of law and policy. As stated 
previously, when machine agents (i.e., the self-driving Tesla in Florida; Muoio, 2016) have been 
involved in the harm of humans, formal inquiries into the origin of blame (e.g., NHTSA, 2017) 
have been integral to the understanding of the machine’s role in the situation. Currently, it 
appears that public and politico-legal opinions on the matter may not always match. Results from 
the study presented herein have suggested that the public is not only willing to blame a machine 
for its mistakes, but may also be interested in seeing that the makers of these machines are held 
accountable. 
Future Research 
Several questions remain which were not explored in this study. Specifically, what 
additional characteristics of people should be examined in relation to moral blame and 
trustworthiness toward machine agents, especially self-driving vehicles? At present, age, 
religion, and ethnicity could play a role. However, as machines continue to permeate different 
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areas of society, we might expect these characteristics to become less defining. Other 
characteristics, such as gaming experience and technology acceptance, could act as mediators 
and should additionally be examined for greater understanding of various attitudes toward 
machine agents. 
Future research should also move this examination into a more applied arena. While the 
findings presented herein are meaningful, they are restricted to the attitudes that people have 
when faced with purely hypothetical situations. Thus, it is important to determine whether these 
findings are upheld in laboratory or even real-world interactions with humans and machines 
making morally-laden mistakes. However, given the ethically questionable nature of creating 
scenarios centered on harm, researchers must be creative in their research designs and use 
simpler moral mistakes for laboratory examinations. 
Further examination is also required for several hypotheses which were supported in this 
study. Specifically, it is important to test whether human-like communications (such as 
apologies) from machine agents are really as effective as they are from human agents. This study 
showed that apologizing and giving an account had similar effects on moral blame toward human 
and machine agents. Thus, a re-examination of this hypothesis in another context, particularly a 
more applied study, or a study with a stronger manipulation, may lead to other findings. 
Supplemental analyses completed for the trustworthiness dimensions suggested that 
integrity may be an area of particular interest when examining human reactions to moral 
mistakes made by human and machine agents. This is a ripe area of research, especially as 
factors such as benevolence and integrity of machine agents have not been considered nearly as 
74 
 
much as factors such as ability. Is it possible to increase perceptions of integrity in machine 
agents? Is it necessary to? Future research should examine these questions. 
Finally, more research should be done to examine sex differences in moral blame and 
trustworthiness research. At the very least, if sex is not included as a variable in studies 
completed on these topics, it should be controlled for through the use of matched-pairs research 
designs. Furthermore, practitioners should consider whether research should be done on the 
design and creation of sex-or-gender-specific machine agents in driving and other contexts. 
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APPENDIX A: NARRATIVES BY CONDITION 
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Note: Each condition is labeled as having a positive (y), negative (n), or neutral (o) 
valence for account and apology. Positive valence indicates the narrative states the account or 
apology was given. Negative valence indicates that the narrative states no account of apology 
was given. Neutral valence indicates that the narrative withheld any additional statement. 
Condition 1: Account (y) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he apologizes and 
explains himself, saying “I regret causing this car accident and your injury. I should have yielded 
to the other car. I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought I had enough time to pull onto 
the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 2: Account (n) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he doesn’t explain 
himself. He apologizes, saying “I regret causing this car accident and your injury. I should have 
yielded to the other car.” 
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Condition 3: Account (o) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he apologizes, saying “I 
regret causing this car accident and your injury. I should have yielded to the other car.” 
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Condition 4: Account (y) Apology (n) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he doesn’t apologize. He 
explains himself, saying “I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought I had enough time to 
pull onto the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 5: Account (n) Apology (n) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he doesn’t apologize or 
explain himself.  
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Condition 6: Account (o) Apology (no) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he doesn’t apologize. 
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Condition 7: Account (y) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he explains himself, 
saying “I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought I had enough time to pull onto the road 
without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 8: Account (n) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When John realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he doesn’t explain 
himself. 
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Condition 9: Account (o) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with John as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, John runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of another vehicle, and causes 
a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly becomes apparent that Charles 
must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and cleared by medical personnel. 
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Condition 10: Account (y) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
apologizes and explains himself, saying “I regret causing this car accident and your injury. I 
should have yielded to the other car. I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought I had 
enough time to pull onto the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 11: Account (n) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
doesn’t explain himself. He apologizes, saying “I regret causing this car accident and your 
injury. I should have yielded to the other car.” 
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Condition 12: Account (o) Apology (y) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
apologizes, saying “I regret causing this car accident and your injury. I should have yielded to 
the other car.” 
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Condition 13: Account (y) Apology (n) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
doesn’t apologize. He explains himself, saying “I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought 
I had enough time to pull onto the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 14: Account (n) Apology (n) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
doesn’t apologize or explain himself.  
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Condition 15: Account (o) Apology (n) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
doesn’t apologize. 
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Condition 16: Account (y) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
explains himself, saying “I didn’t intend to cause a car accident. I thought I had enough time to 
pull onto the road without being hit by the other vehicle.” 
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Condition 17: Account (n) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
 
When the autonomous robot driver realizes that Charles is injured and will miss his interview, he 
doesn’t explain himself. 
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Condition 18: Account (o) Apology (o) 
Charles has an interview at 3 pm in Baltimore. He has been assigned the last available flight to 
Baltimore, which arrives on the same day of the interview. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the interview, it is important that Charles does not miss his flight or the interview. 
 
In order to ensure a timely arrival to the airport, Charles schedules a ride-sharing taxi service to 
take him to the airport 3 hours early on the day of the flight. 
 
The ride-sharing taxi arrives on time, with an autonomous robot as its driver. 
 
On the way to the airport, the autonomous robot driver runs a stop sign, pulls out in front of 
another vehicle, and causes a car accident. Charles is injured in the accident, and it quickly 
becomes apparent that Charles must miss his flight in order to be transported to the hospital and 
cleared by medical personnel. 
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APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL DOCUMENTS 
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Initial Approval 
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Amendment to Receive More Participants 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
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At the request of the chair of the committee, the primary analyses on blame and 
trustworthiness were re-run with certain excluded participants included. Specifically, participants 
who were excluded for completing the survey too quickly (< 90 seconds) or too slowly (> 15 
minutes) were included in these supplementary analyses, resulting in a new total of 538 
participants (as opposed to 507). The purpose of completing these analyses was to identify any 
similarities and differences in effects when these were included in the sample. As such, reporting 
will focus on where these lie. 
Moral Blame 
As in the analyses of the limited sample, there was a main effect of sex on the larger 
sample, F(2, 499) = 4.02, p < .05, p2 = .02, with females once again scoring significantly (p < 
.01) higher (µ = 5.60, SE = .06) than males (µ = 5.38, SE = .05). There was also a significant 
effect of apology, F(2, 499) = 4.48, p < .05, p2 = .02. Post hoc comparisons again showed that 
there was a significant difference in blame scores between the negative valence and the neutral 
valence conditions (p < .05), as well as the negative valence and positive valence conditions (p < 
.05), with blame scores in the negative valence conditions being higher (µ = 5.69, SE = .09) than 
the neutral (µ = 5.40, SE = .07) and positive (µ = 5.40, SE = .11) conditions, respectively. In 
contrast, no significant effect of account was found, nor were there any interaction effects. 
Perceived Trustworthiness 
As in the analyses of the limited sample, there was a main effect of sex on the larger 
sample, F(2, 499) = 5.93, p < .01, p2 = .02, with females once again scoring significantly (p < 
.01) lower (µ = 2.65, SE = .08) than males (µ = 2.99, SE = .07). Additionally, there was once 
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again a main effect of apology F(2, 499) = 21.74, p < .001, p2 = 0.08, with the negative valence 
condition (µ = 2.37, SE = .12) resulting in significantly (p < .01) lower perceived trustworthiness 
than the neutral (µ = 2.88, SE = .09) and positive (µ = 3.13, SE = .14) valence conditions. 
Finally, there was again a main effect of account F(2, 499) = 7.04, p < .001, p2 = .03, with a 
significant (p < .05) difference emerging between the neutral (µ = 2.67, SE = .09) and positive (µ 
= 3.01, SE = .12) valence conditions. There were no interaction effects. 
Discussion 
 Overall, the results between the limited sample and the more inclusive sample were 
similar, with the primary difference being the emersion of additional effects in the more limited 
sample. This could be due to elimination of noise or to an unknown, but potentially causal, 
characteristic of the types of participants eliminated. These differences should be taken into 
account when considering the conclusions drawn from the study. 
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